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Sole Proprietors' Quandry:
Opening the Close Corporation
I. INTRODUCTION
Farm operators are generally accorded the luxury of being free
to choose the form of business enterprise in which they wish to
conduct their profession. The farm lends itself to a variety of busi-
ness structures; principally, the sole proprietorship, partnership and
close corporation.
The independent spirit of the farmer has generally dictated the
use of the sole proprietorship.' Perhaps the popularity of the sole
proprietorship can be attributed to a desire on the part of farm
operators to avoid technical formalities and cumbersome statutory
requirements which normally attend the incorporation process as
well as other forms of business organization. Despite its ease of
operation and practical facility, the proprietory farm has in many
instances been replaced by the closely-held corporation. Owing to
the increased complexity of the modern farming operation, plan-
ning factors which have previously been relatively unimportant
have placed the incorporated farm in vogue.2 Decisions to incorpo-
1. Nearly 90% of the eleven million businesses in the United States are
individual proprietorships. HENw, AGENCY-PARTNMSHIP 160 (1972).
The advantages of the individual proprietorship are several: there is
little or no formal structure, the proprietor works for no one and is
free to make his own decisions, reliance on the discretion of others is
nil, the business need not formally qualify to trade in any given area,
credit is extended to the business on the basis of both its own and its
owners assets and there is no double taxation as there is likely to be
in the incorporated business. Despite its flexibility, the individual pro-
prietorship is also subject to unlimited personal liability and is unable
to use numerous tax benefits available under the corporate form. Id.
at 161-62.
2. While recent figures are not available, it would appear that as early
as 1965, the number of farm corporations in America was 15,000 and
growing. See Harl, Public Policy Aspects of Farm Incorporation, 20
Bus. LAw. 933 (1965). Professor Harl points out that measurement of
farm corporation statistics is difficult since the Census of Agriculture
does not identify farms by method of organization. Id. at 933. It
would seem prudent to speculate that the number has substantially in-
creased with the advent of qualified pension and profit sharing plans
available to qualifying corporations. It is interesting to note that popu-
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rate are often premised upon the assumed-advantages of favorable
tax treatment, financial flexibility, continuity of the enterprise and
limited liability. The need for increased capitalization in large
farms and the necessity of allocating responsibility to more than
one participant have also been prompting factors.
A caveat to incorporation of the farm is warranted, however,
less the prospective incorporator assumes that such a procedure is
a universal salve with which to soothe all of the modern farm's
complexities. Wise counseling would seem to preclude a uniform
recommendation of corporate form, but the enthymemantic nature
of this platitude often falls on deaf ears.3 It is submitted that in-
corporation should not necessarily be favored over other forms of
organization unless it is intended to be used as an estate planning
vehicle.
4
Incorporating a proprietary farm, more often than not, contem-
plates the use of the closely-held corporate form,5 a species of busi-
larity of incorporating the family owned farm is accompanied by grow-
ing public disfavor of the large corporate farm. Kansas has adopted
legislation which prohibits farm incorporation unless the shareholders
number 10 or less.
Similar legislation was contemplated by the Nebraska legislature.
NEE. REv. STAT. §§ 76-1501 to 1506 (Supp. 1975). L.B. 203 would have
struck out vertically integrated farming corporations by limiting the
acceptable number of shareholders to 10 or less who are related to
one another no less than kindred of third degree.
Such limitations would have seriously impinged on the control as-
pects of the close corporation and made it difficult for the proprietor
who contemplated incorporation to arrange the corporate hierarchy to
fit his needs. However, these portions were deleted and the bill as
passed provided that corporations holding agricultural lands must fol-
low certain reporting procedures. See NEm. REv. STAT. §§ 76-1501 to
1506 (Supp. 1975).
3. Perhaps the decision to incorporate is often induced by overzealous
counsel who are reluctant to explain fully the disadvantages of incorpo-
ration and difficulties of control in an effort to avoid "queering the
deal." See Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs
of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 17.
4. For a complete discussion of the use of the corporation in estate plans,
see Kelley, The Farm Corporation as an Estate Planning Device, 54
NEB. L. REv. 217 (1975).
5. Where the corporation has a single shareholder, many of the problems
inherent in the typical close corporation dissipate; this article, however,
does not consider the one man corporation and will be limited to dis-
cussing the propriety of incorporating the farm with a few closely-re-
lated shareholders.
There are myriad definitions which apply to close corporations
(many of which define closeness in terms of numbers of shareholders
and the fact that the stock is not publicly traded); this article adopts
the definition of classifying a corporation as close whenever manage-
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ness organization which is far removed from the traditional con-
cepts of a corporation. Close corporations are decidedly different
from their publicly-held counterparts in terms of internal structure
and practical operation,6 yet traditional corporate statutes and nu-
merous court decisions have tended to ignore these differences to
the detriment of the close corporate shareholders.7  Participants
in the close corporation often find themselves bound by technical,
expensive and time consuming formalities designed to satisfy ob-
ment and ownership coalesce in a small related group of shareholders
in addition to its non-publicly traded nature. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE
CORPOPATEONS § 1.02 (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL].
6. Typically, the close corporation has the following attributes:
(1) the shareholders are few in number, often only two or
three;
(2) they usually live in the same geographical area, know
each other, and are well acquainted with each other's busi-
ness skills;
(3) all or most of the shareholders are active in the business,
usually serving as directors or officers or as keymen in
some managerial capacity; and
(4) there is no established market for the corporate stock, the
shares not being listed on a stock exchange or actively
dealt in by brokers; little or no trading takes place in the
shares.
7. Conventional statutes contemplate the traditional management struc-
ture of the public corporation and tend to ignore the fact that many
of the formalities that lend themselves to bureaucratic structure are not
practically feasible in the close corporation. The traditional view sees
the corporation as a creature of the state and in exchange for the priv-
ilege of incorporation, it must pay tribute to statutory norms. Long
Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77
N.E.2d 633 (1948); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60
N.E.2d 829 (1945); Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944);
Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910).
Formal board meetings, minute documentation, formal shareholder
meetings and other formalities of incorporation are not often palatable
to the former sole proprietor who is used to buying a new piece of
farm equipment without formal board action. Comfort can be found
in recent court decisions, however. Courts have been more willing to
recognize the uniqueness of close corporations than have legislatures.
In recent years, many courts have become aware of the dis-
tinctive characteristics of close corporations and have shown
a somewhat greater readiness than formerly to treat such cor-
porations differently than public-issue corporations. A Cali-
fornia court, [Kauffman v. Meyberg, 59 Cal. App. 2d 730, 739,
140 P.2d 210, 215 (1943)] for instance, has frankly stated that
it will not apply the technical rules commonly applied to cor-
porations to "a close family corporation of two shareholders
of equal ownership" if the application of those rules will "serve
to defeat such equality of ownership, impede justice and per-
petrate fraud," and that it will not permit mere "irregularities"
in the transactions of a family corporation to affect the validity
of those transactions.
O'NEAL at § 1.15.
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solete statutory requirements. At the same time, these participants
are dedicated to the goal of informal operation. Careful considera-
tion of the formal prerequisites and the degree of shareholder lati-
tude allowed under state statutory schemes may reveal that "corpo-
rateness" does not offer the advantages contemplated by the family
farm operator.
This Comment will address the uniqueness of close-corporate
government and the means by which shareholders attempt to effect
control under traditional statutory schemes and analyze the diffi-
culties which confront close corporate shareholders under Ne-
braska's statutory scheme.
II. MINI-CORPORATENESS; MAXI-FORMALITY
Incorporating a business which has traditionally been com-
manded by a single individual or a select group of individuals in-
volves a nearly total change in business philosophy. Where the
business was operated on an informal and pragmatic basis, it is now
subject to the complexities of corporate government. This meta-
morphosis in philosophy is manifested by increased complexity in
management and general policy-making demanded by traditional
corporate government.
In purely legal contemplation, all corporations share common
legal attributes, e.g., a registered trade name under which the cor-
poration operates, the capacity to sue and be sued in that name,
continuity of life or perpetual existence, centralized management,
limited liability and interests which may be freely alienated.8 Col-
lectively these attributes comprise the corporateness of the enter-
prise-the existence of the corporation as an entity distinct from
its owners. Theoretically, corporateness is a privilege granted pur-
suant to strict compliance with statutory norms. The corporate
privilege is conferred by statute and failure to comply with statu-
tory formalities, either in the incorporation process or post-incorpo-
ration activity, typically exposes the corporation to revocation of
the corporate charter or loss of the corporate shield for purposes
of limited liability.9 These statutory norms rarely distinguish be-
8. Id. at 17-21.
9. Generally the risk that corporate status will be disregarded is encoun-
tered in two situations: defective incorporation and continuing use of
the corporation as a proprietorship. Unless proponents of the corpora-
tion are able to use the doctrine of de facto corporation, the entity will
be subject to attack through a quo warranto proceeding for maladies
in the incorporation process. W. CARY, CASES AND MATEIALS ON COR-
PORATIONS 92 (4th ed. unabridged 1969) [hereinafter cited as CARY].
Non-compliance with statutory norms by an ongoing enterprise ex-
poses the individual shareholders to arguments by creditors who at-
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tween close and public issue corporations. The most common ex-
amples of such uniform treatment require that, (1) the manage-
ment of the corporation be vested in a board of directors, 10 each
of whom must exercise their director functions collectively and
with independent discretion;11 (2) decisions regarding policy and
management are to be made according to set voting procedures de-
signed according to the principle of majority rule;12 and (3) under
several state constitutions, the charter voting procedures must pro-
vide for minority representation.' 3  These are general principles
applicable to all corporations, regardless of size, type or the fact that
they are closely held. Nevertheless, unique attributes which distin-
guish the close corporation from publicly traded corporations jus-
tify their independent recognition and separate treatment. Unlike
shareholders in a public issue corporation, close corporation partici-
pants will seek to perform active roles in management and will be
chiefly concerned with control of the enterprise, job security and
the exclusion of outsiders;' 4 in short, ownership and control will
tempt to "pierce the corporate veil." Id. at 122-23. Close corporations
are especially vulnerable to attack because of the informal manage-
ment usually adopted by the shareholders. See O'NF §§ 3.62, 8.04;
cf. CARY 123-24.
10. "The business and -affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board
of directors." NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035 (Reissue 1974).
11. E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954);
Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174,
77 N.E.2d 633 (1948).
12. See CARY at 362.
13. Typically, protection of minority interests is effected through constitu-
tional or statutory provisions for cumulative voting which allows the
shareholder to multiply his voting power by the number of directors
to be elected. Not only does Nebraska have cumulative voting, NEB.
REv. STAT. § 21-2033 (Reissue 1974), but the statute seems to prohibit
non-voting common stock-a provision unique to Nebraska. See Mills,
The Mathematics of Cumulative Voting, 1968 Dunx L.J. 28.
14. One recognized goal of the participants is to achieve partnership advan-
tages within the close corporate form of organization. Hetherington,
supra note 3.
For instance, shareholders in a close corporation commonly are
greatly concerned about the identity of their associates and
have a strong desire to gain and hold the power to choose fu-
ture shareholders or at least to veto prospective purchasers of
shares whom they consider undesirable. They are reluctant to
run the risk of having the harmony and balance of their busi-
ness organization disturbed or the mutual respect and confi-
dence of the shareholder-managers shattered by the unwel-
come intrusion of strangers. As a matter of fact, businessmen
forming a close corporation not uncommonly consider them-
selves partners as to each other. They adopt the corporate
form of business to obtain ... some ... real or fancied ad-
vantage ... but among themselves they are still "partners."
O'NnL at § 1.07.
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coalesce. Individual shareholder investments will be more crucial
since equity ownership is not freely marketable, either because
of a lack of a ready market,15 restrictions on the transfer of
stock,' 6 or both. Shareholders will seek to protect their interests
by retaining management control, placing strict requirements on
the transfer of stock in order to limit new participants and modify-
ing the traditional majority rule through high percentage quorum
and voting procedures in the articles of incorporation, by-laws and
private shareholder agreements1' in order to augment their indi-
vidual control of the corporation.
Traditional statutory schemes tend to ignore the uniqueness of
close corporations and their prescriptions of formal corporate gov-
ernment are often burdensome to shareholders who would, more
often than not, prefer to operate the business and provide for major
business decisions through private and informal agreements. This
informal corporate government offends traditional notions of the
corporate structure. On the other hand, proponents of separate
close corporate treatment see strict adherence to corporate norms
as inconsistent with the fact that those who own the enterprise
completely should be able to arrange management of it as they
wish, so long as corporate creditors are protected.'8 Philosophic-
ally, these two views-the concession theory and the contract
theory-mark the parameters of corporate juridical treatment.' 9
15. As usually defined, the close corporation is one which has no publicly
traded shares (in addition to other attributes). See, e.g., the close cor-
poration statutes of Delaware and Pennsylvania which prohibit close
corporations from making a public distribution of stock. DEL. CODE
Aw. tit. 8, § 342(a)(1)-(3) (1975); PA. STAT. AN. tit. 15, § 1372
(1974). A ready market would be precluded in any case because the
commonly present buy-sell arrangements or transfer restrictions im-
posed by the shareholders or the corporation's charter. See note 17,
infra.
16. For a well-written summary of arrangements concerning the transfer
of close corporate stock, see Bradley, Stock Transfer Restrictions and
Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 139.
17. Professor O'Neal discussed inumerable provisions which can be used
to tailor the corporate charter and by-laws to accommodate the incor-
porators' individual needs in his two volume treatise on close corpora-
tions, O'NEAL, supra note 5. See generally, O'NEAL §§ 3.01-3.80.
18. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). In
Galler, the court specifically enforced a shareholder's voting agreement
which otherwise impinged upon the statutory requirement of majority
rule and ran the risk of impairing director discretion. The court, how-
ever, recognized the distinction between close and public issue corpo-
rations and the propriety of allowing close corporate shareholders
freedom to contract within the corporate form so long as it did not
detrimentally affect creditors.
19. Compare Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964) with Mc-
Quade v. Storeham & McGraw, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934). The
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Prospective incorporators should assess the statutory scheme and
interpretations of the common law in their state to determine
whether they as shareholders will be afforded the wide degree of
latitude contemplated by their "chartered partnership."
Although several states20 have promulgated laws specifically
designed to recognize the uniqueness of close corporations and tend
to permit direct control by the participants, this type of legislation
is relatively new. Moreover, there are relatively few decisions
which tighten shareholder control of close corporations.21 It must
be assumed that the traditional common law approach to corporate
government will continue to be an influential factor in arranging
control of the close corporation.
Nebraska's situation is somewhat complex since judicial au-
thority appears to favor traditional norms of corporate govern-
ment 22 while recent legislation under the Nebraska Business Cor-
poration Act is decidedly more liberal. Further, the Act does not
foster certainty in planning close corporate control since, despite
its liberal nature, it still contains provisions which unquestionably
concession or fiat theory of corporateness can be traced through a line
of decisions beginning with Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A.
568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910), a decision which espoused the view that
a corporation is a corporation is a corporation.
The law never contemplated that persons engaged in business
as partners may incorporate, with intent to obtain advantages
and immunities of corporate form, and then, Proteus-like, be-
come at will a copartnership or a corporation, as the exigencies
or purposes of their joint enterprise may from time to time
require. They cannot be partners inter sese and a corporation
as to the rest of the world.
Id. at 599, 75 A. at 571. Two decisions following the view of strict statu-
tory adherence are Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60
N.E.2d 829 (1945) and Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick The-
aters, 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948). Benintendi struck down, inter
alia, a by-law provision requiring unanimous shareholder votes to
elect directors and Long Park invalidated the transfer of control to
an outside corporation (used as an attempt to "sterilize" the board of
directors). Viewed as the bulwarks of the concession theory, these de-
cisions may be fairly stated to stand for the proposition that those who
seek the benefits of a statute must rigidly comply with its provisions.
As the court in Benintendi noted:
The State, granting to individuals the privilege of limiting their
individual liabilities for business debts by forming themselves
into an entity separate and distinct from the persons who own
it, demands in turn that the entity take a prescribed form and
conduct itself, procedurally, according to fixed rules.
294 N.Y. at 118, 60 N.E.2d at 831.
20. See note 35 infra.
21. Galler v. Galler, 32 I. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
22. See note 25 and accompanying text infra.
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demand adherence to traditional statutory norms.23 Attention is
directed to E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert.24 Although Buck
held a shareholder's agreement valid and, therefore, arguably sup-
ports the contract theory of close corporate management, the court
in dicta relied heavily upon traditional principles of corporate gov-
ernment which severely undermine the shareholder latitude sought
in a chartered partnership.
25
On the other hand Nebraska practice is afforded some liberal
statutory dispensations. Formal shareholder meetings need not be
held for the purposes of taking shareholder action if written con-
sent to the action to be taken is obtained from all of the sharehold-
ers entitled to vote.26  Of course annual meetings are still re-
quired, but traditional notice of the meetings is not required if the
time and place are designated in the charter. 27 Similarly, director
action may be taken without a meeting if unanimous written con-
sent is obtained from board members.
28
Nebraska's statutory scheme does not formally recognize the
close corporation management heirarchy, since it is still contem-
plated that management shall be vested in a board of directors
29
and formal minutes and records of shareholder and director pro-
ceedings must be maintained.30 These provisions would indicate
that close corporation participants are afforded some flexibility in
managing the corporation and are able to carry out daily operations
on an informal basis. Yet it is also reasonably certain, that these
provisions envision the operation of a corporate government, in-
formal though it may be, and do not officially sanction the concept
of a chartered partnership.
III. IMPEDIMENTS TO CLOSE CORPORATION CONTROL
Among the several corporate attributes that work a hardship
23. See, e.g., NEE. REV. STAT. § 21-2027 (notice of shareholders' meeting);
§ 21-2042 (board of directors' meetings); §§ 21-2052 to 2057 (adoption
and amendment of articles of incorporation) (Reissue 1974).
24. 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954). Buck upheld an agreement which
bound the parties to a predetermined ballot of directors and insured
representation on the board by the parties or their heirs. Buck is dis-
cussed in more detail at notes 62-73 and accompanying text, infra.
While Buck is a pre-business corporation act case, its clear articula-
tion of legal principles may be useful in interpreting those sections
of the act which still require adherence to corporate norms.
25. Id. at 891, 62 N.W.2d at 303.
26. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2028 (Reissue 1974).
27. Id. § 21-2027 (Reissue 1974).
28. Id. § 21-2042 (Reissue 1974).
29. Id. § 21-2035 (Reissue 1974).
30. Id. § 21-2050 (Reissue 1974).
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on shareholders in a close corporation 3' is the concept of central-
ized management. Why should participants whose cooperative ef-
forts provide the basis for operating the close corporation be forced
to abide by management decisions made by a board of directors
with independent authority and discretion? At best the board re-
quirement is a formality, yet it is a formality that may create severe
consequences if it is not adhered to. Those who wish to provide
partnership-like control and informality will require a specially
tailored charter 32 or shareholders' contract 33 which vests manage-
31. The traditional attribute of continuity of life, common to all corpora-
tions, can also work a hardship on these shareholders. Unlike other
forms of business, most particularly the general partnership, a corpo-
ration has perpetual existence and, as a separate entity, is not affected
by life span, capacity, bankruptcy or withdrawal of the individual par-
ticipants, unless a defined percentage of the stockholders vote to dis-
solve the corporation. This perpetual life has the advantage of ensur-
ing the continued existence of the enterprise despite the fact that a
dissenting shareholder would prefer to dissolve the corporation and
recoup his investment. This often oppresses a minority shareholder
who has become locked into his investment. See Hetherington, supra
note 3.
In the corporate farm, perpetual life may be advantageous where
the principal owner desires to have the farming operation continue
after his death. For example, where father and son have worked to-
gether as a team, the father's death will not likely halt the operation
even though other heirs are reluctant to maintain the corporation. On
the other hand, death or withdrawal of a shareholder may create fi-
nancial problems for the corporation which is obligated to purchase
a decedent's stock through some type of buy-sell arrangement, or man-
agement problems where the shareholder was a key employee or a
swaying influence who had previously avoided problems of deadlock.
Attempting to circumvent the problems propagated by continuity of
life principles may, in turn, create further problems for the close cor-
poration. Illustrative of this self-perpetuating problem is the device
used for purchase of stock by the corporation; namely, insurance.
Some buy-sell arrangements are funded by insurance purchased by the
corporation on the life of the shareholder. This may create estate tax
problems on the death of the shareholder, see, e.g., C. LOWNDEs, R.
KaAmER & J. McCoRn, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GxFT TAxEs, ch. 13 (3d ed.
1974), and statutory problems in terms of adherence to statutory
norms since the purchase of life insurance for an individual (if that
type of funding arrangement is used) is arguably a loan, and loans
of corporate funds to directors are specifically prohibited by NEB. REv.
STAT. § 21-2045 (Reissue 1974).
32. For an excellent summary of charter tailoring techniques, see O'NWE.AL
§§ 3.11-3.39. Contrary to the traditional corporate model, close corpo-
ration participants will seek to modify the charter to provide them
with real and effective control over management. Assuming this goal
initially requires a voice in board make-up, ideally the charter could
provide that each shareholder could appoint a specified number of di-
rectors. The immediate issue presented by such a clause is whether
the statutory prescription of cumulative voting would be violated. See
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ment in the shareholders as a practical matter, yet pays tribute
to the concept of director management. In the absence of legisla-
tion, charters and agreements are often limited in the latitude of
control which they afford shareholders.
Assuming that the participants are faced with the formal re-
quirement of a board of directors, their primary interest will be
focused upon attaining representation on the board and manipu-
lating that representation to reflect their personal wishes. These
desires are, of course, qualified by the maxim that a board of direc-
tors must be free to exercise discretion in managing the affairs of
a corporation, unhampered by shareholder influence.8 4
A. The Board Requirement
In light of the fact that close corporation participants generally
desire a voice in the affairs of the enterprise, the principle which
dictates that directors must independently manage the ordinary af-
fairs of the corporation is rarely suitable. Management and owner-
ship coalesce where the shareholders retain control.
In jurisdictions like Nebraska where many traditional corporate
norms prevail, the issue necessarily becomes one of the legality of
such unified management. Prospective Nebraska incorporators are
faced with three principal inquiries. First, is a board of directors
in fact required? Second, if the foregoing question is answered in
the affirmative, how may participants best assure themselves a
voice on the board? Finally, may the board be constructively dis-
pensed with and actual management decisions be made by the par-
ticipants?
NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2033 (Reissue 1974) and note 47, infra. Arguably,
§ 21-2033 is not violated where each shareholder may appoint a di-
rector, so long as cumulative voting would not allow him to elect a
number in excess of the allowance granted by a charter provision. See
note 37 and accompanying text infra.
Tailoring the charter will most often involve the use of provisions
which specify unanimous shareholder approval of corporate acts and
procedures for transfer of stock and dissolution of the enterprise, leav-
ing board composition to be determined by voting agreements.
O'NAL § 3.14. Moreover, a charter provision limiting the number of
shares one can hold is useful in preventing a corporate take-over.
This could also be done indirectly by a provision prohibiting the issu-
ance of additional stock and the use of a tightly drawn buy-sell agree-
ment.
33. Shareholder agreements are useful since they provide flexibility and
informality in contrast to formal charter provisions. Participants will
likely view such agreements as the principal method of providing for
a pre-determined board make-up, tenure of corporate employees and
restrictions on the transfer of their holdings. See O'NFAL § 5.02.
34. See McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
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Modern close corporation statutes provide for formal eradication
of the board,35 recognizing the realities of a close corporation's
structure. In Nebraska, however, management is vested in a board
by statute36 and shareholders who wish to retain practical control
must consider this impediment. Facets of management which are
normally left to the discretion of the board are purchase and sale
of assets, appointment of officers together with respective employ-
ment compensation arrangements and policies regarding distribu-
tion of dividends and profits. Board action may, therefore, be
crucial to shareholders who wish to manage the corporation as a
partnership, and securing representation on the board will be a
paramount goal.
It should be noted that choosing methods by which the board
will be elected and controlled will depend upon the number of par-
ticipants contemplated and the extent of equity contribution by
each. The former sole proprietor may have an easier task if he
intends to be the sole shareholder and, a fortiori, the sole director.
Nebraska allows the one man corporation to be managed and oper-
ated by a sole director.37  This is, of course, advantageous to the
former sole proprietor who will not be anxious to leave manage-
ment decisions to the unqualified discretion of a board of directors
even where the board is composed of family members38 since family
ties often loosen in the face of financial self-interest. 39 The former
sole proprietor also has a personal stake in the outcome of the busi-
35. Under Maryland law, the board can be officially abandoned. MD.
ANN. CoDn § 4-401 (1975) further provides:
(a) Governing the corporation.-Under a unanimous
stockholders' agreement, the stockholders of a close corpo-
ration may regulate any aspect of the affairs of the corpora-
tion or the relations of the stockholders, including:
(1) The management of the business and affairs of the
corporation;
See also DEL. CODE AsNw. tit. 8, § 351 (1975); FLA. STATS. ANN. § 608.72
(1974-75); N.J. REv. STATS. § 14A:5-21(2) (1969); PA. STATS. ANN. tit.
15, § 1382 (1974-75) MAINE Bus. CoRP. Acr (1974); ME. REv. STATS.
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 701(2) (1973); MIcH. STATS. ANN. § 21.200(501)
(1974); Tax. Bus. CoRP. ACT art. 2.30-1(B) (1974-75 Supp.); O'NEAL
§ 3.60.
36. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 21-2035 (Reissue 1974).
37. Id. § 21-2036 (Reissue 1974).
38. Prior to its revision, NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2036 (Reissue 1974), required
the traditional three director board.
39. Family ties can be made of paper when financial interests are at stake.
Witness the case of Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967), where a sibling feud over a shareholders'
agreement resulted in a conspiracy action prosecuted by a brother
against two brothers who were privy to the agreement and which re-
quested the award of treble damages.
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ness which represents his livelihood as opposed to a part-time in-
vestment, and this personal stake is better protected where he
represents the sole management influence in the enterprise.
Where possible, the one man board would be advantageous to
a principal stockholder in close enterprises of few or several parti-
cipants but it is arguable that a one man board is not permissible
in Nebraska except in those situations where the sole director is
the sole shareholder. In Nebraska, cumulative voting is required
by constitutional mandate.40  If multiple shareholders were per-
mitted to use a one man board by agreement, cumulative voting
would have no impact, and the minority interests would be denied
a director. This analysis results from judicial interpretation to the
effect that while shareholders may agree among themselves to
waive cumulative voting guarantees, the corporate charter may
not provide for such a waiver.41 Because the number of directors
are required to be set forth in the by-laws, 42 it is possible that
a provision establishing a one man board would be viewed as a cor-
porate act eliminating the right to minority representation.
As a practical matter, however, there is a further limitation on
the use of a single director-the desire of minority shareholders
to participate in business decisions. Even if it were possible to cir-
cumvent the constitutional guarantee of cumulative voting, it might
be difficult to obtain the minority approval, to forego their oppor-
tunity to have a voice in fixing dividend policies and salaries since
these items may constitute their sole source of income.
48
40. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1974). Cumulative voting al-
lows a shareholder to concentrate his voting power by magnifying it
and directing it to the representative of his choice. It is best explained
through statutory language; Nebraska's implementing statute provides
in part:
In all elections for directors every stockholder entitled to vote
at such elections shall have the right to vote in person or by
proxy for the number of shares owned by him, for as many
persons as there are directors, to be elected or to cumulate said
shares and give one candidate as many votes as the number
of directors multiplied by the number his shares shall equal,
or to distribute them upon the same principle among as many
candidates as he shall think fit, and such directors shall not
be elected in any other manner.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2033 (Reissue 1974) (emphasis added).
41. E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288
(1954). The rationale is that the corporate charter must at least per-
mit cumulative voting and if the shareholders privately agree to waive
their right to it, that is a different matter. See Sensabaugh v. Polson
Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d 1064 (1959).
42. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2036 (Reissue 1974).
43. Unlike the public issue shareholder who can "buy short" and "sell
long," "it is only in the close corporation that a participant or investor
in a business venture can simultaneously be excluded from participa-
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Where the former proprietor or former partners must rely upon
outside capital or services, it is safe to assume that a board will
be demanded which is large enough to ensure a modicum of repre-
sentation. Thus the problem becomes one of board make-up-how
may participants best assure themselves a voice on the board?
Perhaps the least troublesome method is through a private
agreement. A shareholders' agreement which predetermines how
a participant shall cast his vote is permissible in Nebraska44 and
may be preferable to the alternatives described below.
Another method of allocating control of voting power to elect
the board is the use of more than one class of stock. Under this
scheme, two or more classes of shares are issued to the shareholders
with each class having the voting power to elect a specified number
or percentage of directors. Control of the board is assured by hold-
ing the majority of each class even though equity interests in the
enterprise are more evenly apportioned.45 The obvious drawback
to using more than one class of stock is the loss of ability to use
the subchapter S election under the Internal Revenue Code and
the consequential condemnation of the enterprise to double taxa-
ation.4 6
A third technique classifies the board itself.4 7 This is really
tion in earnings and prevented from withdrawing his investment and
at least a portion of his share of accumulated profits from the busi-
ness." Heatherington, supra note 4 at 21.
Such shareholder's plight is threefold. First, he is locked into his
investment because of its highly personal nature. See Kramer &
Zieger, The Choice of Form for the Family Owned Business, 16
HAsr=Gs L.J. 509 (1965). Second, there will nearly always be some
provision for restriction on his transfer of stock. See Bradley, Stock
Transfer Restrictions and Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 139.
Third, there will be no ready market for the stock since the stock will
not be registered on any public exchange. Id.
44. E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
Although NEB. RFV. STAT. § 21-2034 (Reissue 1974) provides that such
an agreement is enforceable, it is uncertain if a Nebraska court would
award specific performance for such an agreement if it were breached.
See Ringling-Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ring-
ling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947); Abercrombie v. Davies, 36
Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (1957).
45. See O'Neal, Close Corporation Control Devices, 61 ILL. B.J. 118, 119
(1972).
46. If the corporation has more than one class of stock, it is not a "small
business corporation" under section 1371, and, therefore, may not make
an election under section 1372.
47. Classified boards are one method by which the effect of minority rep-
resentation can be diluted. For example, if a nine director board were
split into three classes, each of which was to be elected at alternate
yearly intervals, minority shareholders would not be able to procure
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an exception to the normal requirement that the whole board be
elected annually. By dividing the board into two or three classes
and electing only one class annually, a majority shareholder may
magnify his control through the election of a majority of each class.
While classified boards are permitted in Nebraska,48 it remains
to be seen whether that provision is constitutional in light of the
cumulative voting requirement. 49  Classified boards were found
unacceptable in Wolfson v. Avery, 50 where the Illinois Supreme
Court held that cumulative voting requires all of the directors to
be elected annually. This decision raises serious doubts about the
validity of Nebraska's statute allowing classified boards.51
representation. See Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701
(1955) which held that a statute permitting such classification was un-
constitutional in view of that portion of the Illinois Constitution man-
dating cumulative voting. But see Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.,
387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956). But classified boards are not merely
useful as a means of maintaining majority control since they also pro-
vide management continuity and stability.
48. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2037 (Reissue 1974).
In lieu of electing the whole number of directors annually,
the articles of incorporation may provide that the directors
be divided into either two or three classes, each class to con-
sist of not less than three directors ....
49. See note 40, supra.
50. 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
51. The defendants in Wolfson claimed that the constitutional provision
for cumulative voting was not violated by a classified board since the
phrase, "to be elected" (compare note 36, supra), contemplated proper
elections where less than all of the board was to be elected. There-
fore, argued the defendants, so long as a shareholder was allowed to
cumulate his votes at an election, irrespective of the fact that it was
an election of one class only, the constitutional guarantee was provided
for. Wolfson held, in effect, that cumulative voting requires all di-
rectors to be elected annually.
A careful examination of the entire section fails to disclose any
indication that the words "to be elected", appearing in the first
clause, were intended to imply that less than the entire board
could be elected at one time. On the contrary, the second
clause of the section, which deals expressly with cumulative
voting, indicates rather that all directors must be elected at
each regular election.
Section 35 of the Business Corporation Act, in authorizing the
classification of directors is inconsistent with the constitutional
right of a stockholder to cumulate his shares through multiply-
ing them by the "number of directors,". ...
Id. at 85-86, 95, 126 N.E.2d at 706, 711. Nebraska's statute allowing
classification of the board is nearly identical with the provision struck
down in Wolfson. See NEs. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2033 and 21-2037 (Re-
issue 1974). Reliance upon these sections is questionable.
In addition to classification of stock and directors, it must be re-
membered that power to remove a recalcitrant director is also im-
portant to the close corporation shareholder. Under the common law,
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Another means by which participants may predetermine who
shall serve as directors is the voting trust, also permissible in Ne-
braska.52  The voting trust allows shareholders to do indirectly
what a voting agreement accomplishes directly, i.e., set forth nomi-
nees for director slots who shall receive predetermined votes.
Shareholders enter into a trust agreement whereby they transfer
title to their shares to a voting trustee in exchange for ownership
certificates. The trustee, of course, will vote in accordance with
the trust agreement.5 3
B. Controlling the Board
To be distinguished from the problem of predetermining board
composition is the question of whether director decisions may be
controlled. Control over who shall comprise the board is clearly
not the same as control over the board's judgment. It is reasonably
certain that close corporation participants will seek to control the
every day operation of the business either as directors themselves
or through effective control over the directors. Within acceptable
statutory parameters, they will attempt to fix by charter provision
or shareholder agreement policies regarding their powers to remove
a director could be removed only for cause. Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y.
427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954). While modern statutory schemes allow
director removal with or without cause, see, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT § 39 (1971) (allowing removal with or without cause by
a majority of the shareholders), this power is substantially diluted in
the usual instance by added provisions which protect the cumulative
voting right. Nebraska's statute offers a good example:
Any director ... may be removed, with or without cause, by
a vote of the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled
to vote at an election of directors. If less than the entire board
is to be removed, no one of the directors may be removed if
the votes cast against his removal would be sufficient to elect
him if then cumulatively voted at an election of the entire
board of directors.
NEB. Rrv. STAT. § 21-2039 (Reissue 1974). This power is also limited
where shareholders make use of classified boards or separate classes
of stock since shareholders of one class of stock only possess power
to remove directors elected in that class. O'NEAL § 3.59.
52. NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 21-2034 (Reissue 1974).
53. Holding companies may also be formed for the purposes of arranging
defined voting procedure. In Baum v. Baum Holding Co., 158 Neb.
197, 62 N.W.2d 864 (1954), the court sustained the validity of an ar-
rangement whereby four corporate shareholders established a separate
corporation, to hold their stock. Thus a majority shareholder in the
holding company exercised effective control over the whole transferor
corporation even though he had not been a majority shareholder of
the transferor. While holding companies are obviously permitted in
Nebraska, they are simply another step in the already too complex
scheme of controlling the close corporation and do not appear to be
worth the time or expense.
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directors, inspect books and records, exercise pre-emptive rights, re-
solve disputes and deadlocks, compensate directors and officers, de-
clare dividends and distribute profits.
54
The extent to which participants may practically vest manage-
ment in themselves, despite the existence of a board, is not clear
in Nebraska. Although statutory provisions authorize the appoint-
ment of an executive committee to manage the corporation, such
a committee is still subject to director supervision. 5 A strict cur-
54. Leaving such powers to the board of directors would remove corporate
control from the hands of the principal shareholder and, more impor-
tantly, would subject minority shareholders to the dictates of the ma-
jority. More importantly, participation in the close corporation is very
likely the only income available to the shareholder, thus, he will pre-
fer to bargain for such items as compensation and distribution of
profits rather than leaving such matters to a majority vote or, in the
alternative, demand that more than a majority vote is required to
change policies that are set forth in the original charter. See, Hether-
ington, supra note 3; O'NFaL § 4.13.
55. NEB. RIv. STAT. § 21-2041 (Reissue 1974) permits the creation of an
executive committee composed of directors who may exercise the au-
thority of the directors in some circumstances. Most notably, such an
executive committee may not exercise director function with respect
to sale, leases, exchanges, mortgages or pledges of all or substantially
all of the corporate property and may not take action regarding
amendments to the charter or dissolution.
On the surface, § 20-2041 would seem to allow some latitude for
focusing powers of management, otherwise vested in the board, upon
specific named shareholders-a palatable prospect for the former farm
operator since the section requires only that a majority of the board
elect such a "management committee." It would therefore be possible
totally to control corporate management by virtue of a simple ma-
jority of the voting power of the corporation. Such a broad interpreta-
tion of the provision may be unwarranted, however.
Courts have traditionally allowed such "management arrange-
ments" if such an executive committee is under the supervision of the
board, see, e.g., Marvin v. Solventol Chem. Prods., Inc. 298 Mich. 296,
298 N.W. 782 (1941), realizing that true management power still re-
mains with the board. Section 21-2041 seems to fit this mold since
it provides: "The designation of any such committee and the delega-
tion thereto of authority shall not operate to relieve the board of di-
rectors, or any member thereof, of any responsibility imposed by law."
Arguably, this provision is intended to retain power in the board not-
withstanding the creation of an "executive committee." Directors
would still be under a fiduciary duty to protect the best interests of
the corporation and would not be permitted to use such a device to
their own or a selected shareholder's benefit.
Nor would the use of the section to create a de facto abolition of
the board appear proper not merely because of the express proviso
in the statute but also because such use would be vulnerable to attack
on several grounds. Such abolition would surely violate the statutory
requirement of § 21-2035 that management be vested in a board of
directors. It is also arguable that creation of such a committee would
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tailment of directors' functions would be questionable in light of
the Nebraska Supreme Court's dictum recognizing the common law
prohibition against creation of a dummy or sterilized board.56 The
independent discretion of the board may not be impinged.
Avoiding a course of action which binds the directors to prede-
termined conduct is of paramount importance, but additional con-
siderations respecting control weigh heavily against the choice of
the corporate form. Few close corporation shareholders are enam-
ored with the thought of complex business procedures. But effec-
tive control of the close corporation in a state which has traditional
statutes requires sophisticated charter drafting57 and attention to
business detail in the actual operation of the business.58 Although
Nebraska's statutory scheme is fairly liberal, the fact remains that
a corporation should not be allowed to operate as a partnership.
Of course, shareholders would prefer to control the business
without the use of charter and by-law provisions. Shareholders'
create a sterilized board of directors or impinge upon the individual
shareholder's right to cumulatively cast their votes.
Finally, as a practical matter, total control could not be achieved
in this type of arrangement in any case since directors hold office for
limited terms. Since the committee is chosen by the board, it would
also be subject to yearly fluctuations. O'Neal, Buy-Sell and Dispute
Arrangements, 61 ILL. B.J. 186 (1972).
The shareholder/directors must tread carefully in allocating control
among themselves so as not to violate the maxim that a "sterilized
board of directors cannot be created." O'NEAL § 3.60; McQuade v.
Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
56. In holding a shareholders agreement valid because, inter alia, it did
not infringe upon board discretion, the court in E. K. Buck Retail
Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954), implied that
the provision vesting management in a board of directors is a statutory
command that cannot be circumvented:
There are certain fundamentals pertaining to corporate control
... upon which there can be little or no dispute.... An
agreement purporting to control the actions of directors after
they are elected, in handling the ordinary business of the cor-
poration, is ordinarily void .... The law imposes the business
management of the corporation on its directors, who represent
all of the stockholders and creditors, and they cannot enter into
agreements among themselve. or with stockholders by which
they purport to abdicate their independent judgment.
Id. at 882-83, 62 N.W.2d at 299. Even the statutory provision for ap-
pointment of an executive committee would not seem to impair this
principle. See note 55, supra.
57. For a summary of some of the more sophisticated means of controlling
the close corporation, see O'Neal, supra note 45.
58. Even the practicing bar would concede that close corporations are not
in the habit of following technicalities such as formal notice being sent
to the board prior to the time of a meeting. Nebraska State Bar Pro-
ceedings, 43 NEB. L. Rnv. 177, 310 (1963).
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agreements provide the traditional method for achieving this in-
formality. It is regrettable that without special close corporation
legislation, shareholders can never be quite sure to what extent
they may control the enterprise through private agreement.5 9 To
the extent they are possible, shareholder agreements are desirable
because they provide flexibility and informality. Yet the necessity
of adhering to statutory formality often precludes the use of such
devices. As a general rule, such agreements are inconsistent with
traditional statutory norms if they operate to invade the province
of the directors. Courts have also rejected shareholder agreements
where they adversely affect shareholders who are not privy to the
contract.60
The modern judicial trend, on the other hand, is to uphold share-
holder agreements if they are designed to effectuate a particular
corporate policy or assure adherence to a particular course of busi-
ness. 61 Nevertheless, it would seem imprudent to assume that
shareholders need only resort to private contracts to effect control
of the board since the parties may not know whether the agreement
is valid or enforceable until it is tested by litigation, and would
prefer some certainty at the planning stages of the enterprise.
59. Close corporation statutes often delineate all of the acceptable facets
of control which may be handled by shareholder agreement. For ex-
ample, under Maryland law, agreements may deal specifically with
management of business affairs, restriction on the transfer of stock,
rights of the shareholders regarding dissolution of the corporation, vot-
ing power, employment contracts, dividends and distribution of profits
and the make-up of the board of directors. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23,
§ 105(a) (1) (Repl. vol. 1973). Shareholders' agreements are obvi-
ously permissible in Nebraska under the common law by virtue of E.
K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954),
but there is also little doubt that the discretion of the board of di-
rectors cannot be impinged. Id. As a result, the prospective incor-
porator is unsure whether an agreement regarding the distribution of
profits or some other aspect of management normally left to the dis-
cretion of the board of directors' will be acceptable.
60. Note that even in states which have promulgated close corporation
statutes specifically allowing shareholders' agreements, there is a re-
quirement that all shareholders be signatories to such agreements.
Such stockholders' agreement shall be embodied in the charter,
the by-laws or a written instrument signed by all of the stock-
holders of the corporation.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 105 (a) (Repl. vol. 1973). Query whether
a shareholders' agreement would pass muster in Nebraska without the
assent of all stockholders. Since there is no statutory provision, one
is forced to guess in light of the available decisions. Arguably, it is
possible in view of Buck, which upheld a shareholders' agreement
signed by only two of several stockholders.
61. O'Neal, supra note 45 at 122.
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Close corporation participants will, therefore seek some cer-
tainty in determining how far they may go in constructively dis-
pensing with a board through shareholder agreements. At least
two decisions partially answer this question. Buck Retail Stores
v. Harkert,62 involved a shareholders' agreement which prede-
termined the appointment of directors. 63 Although the case is
somewhat dated and has surely been qualified by the Nebraska
Business Corporation Act, it provides a perspective on how the
court views the function of a board.
Buck and Harkert agreed that each would have the power to
designate two of the corporation's four directors. The agreement
compelled the parties to vote at each annual election in accordance
with this agreement. Additionally, it provided for a long term ex-
ecutive appointment of Harkert, an appointment normally left to
the discretion of the board. Harkert claimed that the agreement
was invalid since it impinged upon director discretion and violated
the constitutional guarantee of cumulative voting.64 The court up-
62. 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
63. The contract actually provided:
That the number of the members of the Board of Directors
of Harkert Houses be reduced from five, as it now is, to the
number of four, and that said four members of the new Board
shall consist of said Walter E. Harkert, Mercedes C. Harkert,
his wife, Earl K. Buck and Rodney B. Devor, and that the
number of members of said Board of Directors shall be main-
tained at four in number, of which at all time. two thereof
shall be such persons as shall be nominated or designated by
the said Walter E. Harkert or his heirs, representatives or
legatees, and the other two thereof shall be persons as shall be
nominated or designated by the said party of the second part.
And it is further mutually agreed between the parties that at
all stockholders' meetings of the said Harkert Houses held for
the purpose of election of directors or director (in case of
vacancy on the Board of Directors), that all of the said shares
of stock of parties of the first part and also of party of the
second part and also any additional shares of stock of the
Harkert Houses which may be subsequently acquired by the
said parties or either of them shall be voted in such manner
and for such person or persons as will keep and maintain the
Board of Directors four in number, of which two thereof shall
be such persons as shall be nominated or designated by the
said party of the second part.
Id. at 870, 62 N.W.2d at 293.
64. The argument claiming constitutional infringement centered on lan-
guage providing that directors shall not be elected in any other man-
ner. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2033 (Reissue 1974). According to the ar-
gument, this language logically prohibits the election of directors by
prearranged agreement. The court disagreed, finding that the lan-
guage only operates to
prevent a corporation by its articles of incorporation, by-laws,
or any act of its directors or stockholders from depriving a
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held the validity of the arrangement, reasoning that such control
agreements are not ipso facto void and are enforceable where the
shareholder contracts with respect to his own stock voting rights
and does not injure the corporation or work a fraud upon credi-
tors.
65
The more recent Illinois decision in Galler v. Galler66 also in-
volved the question of the permissible scope of a shareholders
agreement. Two brothers owned nearly all of the shares of a
wholesale drug company. The brothers agreed to amend the by-
laws of the enterprise to provide for four directors and that as
shareholders they were bound to cast their votes for themselves
and their wives. The agreement further provided that in the event
of either brother's death, his wife would have the right to nominate
a replacement who had the right to receive shareholder votes under
the agreement just as the predecessor had. Unlike the Buck con-
tract, however, the contract also contained provisions for the decla-
ration of a minimum dividend and a salary continuation stipulation
which served as a "widow's pension." The court upheld the validity
of the contract recognizing that a close corporation was to be dis-
tinguished from its public issue counterpart and that agreements
entered into by participants in a close corporation were not invalid
even where they controlled the power and discretion of the board
provided that the creditors of the enterprise were not adversely
affected.
6 7
Although Buck is often cited for the proposition that share-
holder agreements are valid under the modern trend of judicial au-
thority, 8 the case may not stand for so broad a proposition. Buck
recognizes that shareholder agreements are neither ipso facto void
nor valid. The decision may be said to stand for two general propo-
sitions. First, a court is likely to uphold shareholder agreements
where no single shareholder is placed in absolute control or
uniquely benefited. 69 Second, shareholder agreements are accept-
able, assuming the first criterion has been met, only so long as they
stockholder of the right to vote his stock in the manner speci-
fied in the Constitution and statute.
157 Neb. at 873, 62 N.W.2d at 294.
65. Id. at 889, 62 N.W.2d at 302.
66. 32 lL 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
67. Id. at 27-30, 203 N.E.2d at 583-85.
68. See, e.g., O'NEAi. § 5.08.
69. It is possible to argue that a shareholders' agreement should accrue
to the benefit of the corporation as a whole. The court in Buck seemed
to favor the view that shareholder agreements bargain away certain
voting powers in exchange for fresh capital (from the party seeking
to obtain the agreement) which accrues to the benefit of all sharehold-
ers. Id. at 890-91, 62 N.W.2d at 302-03.
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do not remove significant powers from the board of directors. 70
The agreement in Buck satisfied these requirements since no share-
holder retained control of the board and the directors exercised full
discretion after their initial appointment.71
Despite the importance of Buck as a decision recognizing the
validity of shareholder agreements generally, it is perhaps an over
statement to say that Buck recognizes the validity of discretion-
limiting agreements. On the other hand, Galler seems to indicate
that limiting board discretion is a permissible objective-at least
where all of the participants are parties to the agreement and the
agreement enforces a "permissible" corporate objective.7 2 The im-
portance of Galler cannot be over emphasized since it upheld the
validity of the agreement in light of a business corporation act
which is substantially similar to Nebraska's. 73
In light of Buck and Galler it is arguable that shareholders'
agreements are indeed valid in Nebraska-even to the extent of
nominally limiting director discretion if those agreements accomp-
lish a valid corporate purpose and do not adversely affect minority
interests.
70. There is no clear answer as to what constitutes a "sterilization of the
board." It is clear that some director discretion can be taken away
by shareholder agreement. Buck cites with approval the decision of
Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936) which arguably rec-
ognizes that some restrictions can be made on directorial functions so
long as they are "negligible."
71. The decision must be placed in perspective as it relates to sharehold-
ers' agreements generally. It is possible to read the decision as relat-
ing only to shareholder agreements which are the functional equiva-
lents of "vote pooling arrangements" or voting trusts. These types of
agreements have traditionally been valid in Nebraska. The foregoing
proposition is better seen in light of the court's reluctance to pass upon
the validity of that portion of the Buck/Harkert agreement which pro-
vided for indefinite employment of Harkert as an officer at a fixed
salary. The court declined to answer that issue and did not need to
since it found that Harkert was estopped from contesting the validity
of a provision he had reaped the benefits from for so long. 157 Neb.
at 892, 62 N.E.2d at 303-04.
72. The court noted:
Obviously, there is no evil inherent in a contract entered into
for the reason that the persons originating the terms desired
to so arrange their property as to provide post-death support
for those dependent upon them. Nor does the fact that the
subject property is corporate stock alter the situation so long
as there exists no detriment to minority stock interests, credi-
tors or other public injury.
32 Ill. 2d at 33, 203 N.E.2d at 586.
73. Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). Illinois and Ne-
braska have both adopted the Model Business Corporation Act. Com-
pare ILL. REv. STAT. with NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2001 et seq. (Reissue
1974).
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What in fact constitutes a "permissible objective" is not clear.
Arguably the use of a shareholders' agreement to vest management
discretion in a limited number of individuals would not be a permis-
sible objective-at least without the consent of minority interests.
The concept of legitimate shareholder agreements is probably best
seen through use of the following situations.
1. Contracting With Respect to Voting Rights
In light of the constitutional guarantee of cumulative voting, it
would appear that not all arrangements whereby shareholders
agree to a pre-determined board composition would be invalid. Buck
has determined, however, that the cumulative voting guarantee
merely mandates that the corporation permit cumulative voting and
a private contract among shareholders may waive that right.74 In
short, beneficial ownership can be separated from voting power.
The constitution merely protects against the involuntary loss of the
right to cumulate votes for the shareholder's choice of directors.
It does not limit the right to contract with respect to one's own
stock. It may therefore be fairly stated that in Nebraska, share-
holder restrictions regarding voting rights may be freely bargained
for, but the articles and by-laws may not infringe upon these rights.
It is doubtful, however, whether such a license really aids the
former sole proprietor who is anxious to carry on his business as
before, but now in a corporate form. The latitude granted share-
holders in tailoring their votes for board composition or shareholder
action is tempered by the apparent limitation that such an arrange-
ment cannot uniquely benefit any one shareholder.75 Since Buck
74. See notes 64 & 65 supra.
75. Professor O'Neal suggests that the draftsman state purposes which
benefit the corporation as a whole in the preamble to the agreement.
O'Nw.L § 5.08.
Perhaps the most comprehensive checklist available regarding
factors which affect the validity of voting shareholders agreements is
also articulated by Professor O'Neal:
(1) the purpose or object of the agreement,
(2) the statutes in force in the particular jurisdiction in
which the agreement is made,
(3) The conceptions of public policy prevailing in the courts
of the jurisdiction regarding the separation of voting
power from the beneficial ownership of shares,
(4) the situation of the corporation and the shareholders at
the time the agreement was made,
(5) whether or not all of the shareholders in the corporation
are parties to the agreement,
(6) whether the contracting shareholders are also directors or
expect to be at the time of the performance of the con-
tract,
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places heavy emphasis on the fact that no single shareholder has
control of the board76 it is reasonably clear that voting arrange-
ments allowing one shareholder to determine unilaterally board
composition would be carefully scrutinized.7 7
2. Contracting With Respect to Management
Clearly, director discretion cannot be uniformly abdicated by a
shareholders' agreement. There must be a legitimate purpose for
limiting discretion and careful attention must be paid to minority
interests.
[W] e think the correct rule is that stockholders' control agreements
are valid where it is for the benefit of the corporation, where it
works no fraud upon creditors or other stockholders and where it
violates no statute or recognized public policy.7 8
Arguably, control agreements which uniformly restrict or control
director function violate both the laws and policy of Nebraska.
The creation of a dummy board of directors, or, in the language of
some of the cases, a sterilized board of directors, by a stockholder
agreement, is usually held to be void. But the mere fact that a
board of directors of four members is created with the understand-
ing that each shall nominate two, is not of itself unlawful. The
validity of such a contract is determined by the nature of the re-
(7) the length of time during which the agreement will con-
trol the shareholders' right to vote their shares,
(8) whether the person challenging the validity of the agree-
ment is a party to it or is a creditor or shareholder not
party to the agreement,
(9) whether the person challenging the agreement is simply
trying to 'welch' on his undertaking,
(10) whether or not there is consideration, other than the mu-
tual promises of the parties to support the undertakings,
to vote in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
(11) how long the contract has been in operation and the ex-
tent to which action has been taken or positions have
been changed in reliance on it, and
(12) perhaps the kind of corporation whose stock is subject
to the voting arrangement.
O'NFAL § 5.07 (footnotes omitted).
76. The court noted:
We point out once more that the agreement does not place
Buck, the owner of 40 percent of the stock, in control of the
corporation. It does give him a veto power over questions of
corporate policy. It is plain that Buck would not have ...
[injected new capital] . . . without the stock control agree-
being made. It must be assumed that the purpose of the
agreement was to prevent the corporation from getting into fi-
nancial distress ....
157 Neb. at 890, 62 N.W.2d at 302-03.
77. See Kessler, The Shareholder-Managed Close Corporation Under the
New York Business Corporation Law, 43 FoRwm L. REv. 197 (1974).
78. 157 Neb. at 883, 62 N.W.2d at 299.
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strictions placed upon the board in carrying out their duty to exer-
cise their best judgment in managing the affairs of the corporation.
Where the control agreement leaves the directors free to act after
being selected, we fail to see where there is a violation of any law
or established rule of public policy. The mere fact that a board is
created which may split evenly on a matter of corporate policy is
not a basis for voiding the contract. In the instant case the direc-
tors were free to manage the ordinary business affairs of the cor-
poration without contractual restraint. It is not a dummy or
sterilized board within the ordinary meaning of those terms.79
While the Buck decision clearly shows that shareholder agree-
ments inter sese may validly affect voting rights, it is not clear
whether such agreements may also predetermine such matters as
employment and compensation arrangements or dividend policy.
These subjects will be vitally important to the participants since
salary and dividends are generally the sole means of recognizing
a return on their investments. It is certainly arguable that the
Buck and Galler decisions support the proposition that shareholders
may properly contract with respect to these matters. Galler clearly
indicates that dividend policy may be left to the discretion of the
shareholders 80 and Buck seems to indicate that an agreement which
crystalizes employment and compensation would pass muster.
8 '
Nevertheless, it is far from certain whether agreements which
deal with these matters are valid absent specific statutory authori-
zation.8 2 The rationale against validity is apparently based upon
the prohibition against impinging upon board discretion, the prohi-
bition against limiting the powers of future boards, the invalidity
of agreements among directors themselves, and the practical im-
pediment to the specific performance of employment contracts. 83
79. Id. at 891, 62 N.W.2d at 303.
80. Galler did note, however, that dividend policies must be designed to
protect the corporation, i.e., so long as a stated minimum surplus is
retained, a mandatory dividend is a legitimate subject for shareholders
agreements. 32 Ill. 2d at 34, 203 N.E.2d at 587.
81. 157 Neb. at 883, 62 N.W.2d at 299. Note, however, that Galler ex-
pressly held employment compensation to be a valid subject for such
a contract. 32 ll. 2d at 34, 203 N.E.2d at 587.
82. O'NEL § 6.06.
83. Id. The policy is stated by Professor O'Neal as being twofold. First,
corporate statutes give the board power to manage the affairs of the
business, and it would be contrary to statutory norms to predetermine
that management discretion in future boards. Second, the concept of
annual elections of the board contemplates that shareholders will be
given a chance to elect directors annually and through that board of
directors, their choices for officers and other employees of the business.
Note that since equitable remedies are generally unavailable to en-
force employment contracts, a deprived party would be forced to rely
upon damages at law, a situation which may not be palatable to a
minority interest shareholder who is anxious to cement a long term
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Close corporation participants are therefore left with the all-too-
familiar balancing test: shareholders may contract with respect to
certain management functions provided that the powers removed
from the board of directors are not too extensive.
Another impediment to corporate control by the majority is the
danger of overreaching minority interest participants. Although
it would be difficult to label a shareholders' agreement unconscion-
able in the formal sense of the word, 4 the analysis followed in
Buck indicates that the court will look closely at agreements that
tend to work an unfair advantage on minority interests. 85 It is
interesting to note that minority interests in the close corporate
enterprise are traditionally oppressed. As one author has pointed
out,86 minority interests in the close corporation are forced to go
along for the ride and follow the whims of the majority interests
without the ability to liquidiate their interests-at least through
their own volition. On the other hand, provisions for unanimity
of decision set forth in the charter or outlined in shareholder agree-
ments protect minority interests by conferring upon them veto
powers but also subject the enterprise to the dangers of deadlock
and stalemate.8" It would appear that neither alternative would
employment agreement. Perhaps a provision allowing liquidated
damages should be demanded by minority shareholder-employees, a
situation which would be equally unpalatable to majority sharehold-
ers.
84. Since the contracting parties are in a "take it or leave it" position,
it would be difficult to find that a party is victimized by both pro-
cedural and substantive maladies in the contract forming process-tra-
ditional requirements for finding unconscionability. See J. Wm'rr &
R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoIM=RcI.L CODE 118, 119 (1972).
85. Where control of the business is exploited to the prejudice of minority
interests, it would appear that a Nebraska court would have little dif-
ficulty in striking down the agreement to control since no benefit ac-
crues to the corporation as a whole.
86. Hetherington, supra note 3 at 20. Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation
of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corporation Statutes, 1968 DuKE
L.J. 525.
Professor Heatherington points out that minority shareholders
rarely bargain for protection against future disagreements and retain
little to protect themselves against majority discretion. Exploited
minorities are the rule rather than the exception in the close corporate
structure. Since the power to manage in the close corporation is tanta-
mount to the power to allocate benefits arbitrarily among principal
stockholders, he argues that, as an alternative, minority interests
maintain the right to be bought out at pre-arranged figures.
87. A veto power in the hands of minority interests may mean a stulti-
fied board. The ability to render any policy decision nugatory will
also invite extraordinary tactics on the part of minority stockholders.
O'Neal, supra note 45. See also note 82 supra. The Maryland statute
also provides that subsequent purchasers (as opposed to donees and
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be acceptable to the former sole proprietor since in the latter in-
stance he loses the flexibility of the "chartered partnership," and
in the former instance he subjects himself to the danger of having
agreements invalidated as "unfair." Of course, no shareholder is
forced to enter the venture. This would auger against a contention
that shareholder agreements are overreaching.
IV. ILLUSORY ADVANTAGES
OF CLOSE INCORPORATION
The concept of limited liability is perhaps the most illusory ad-
vantage to incorporating the family farm. While the corporate
form of business normally insulates the shareholders from personal
liability, the unique qualities of the close corporation often create
exceptions to this general rule. Proper planning and drafting will
aid in avoiding these difficulties in many cases, thus those who wish
to incorporate should become familiar with the numerous exceptions
to limited liability in the close corporation. There are essentially
three categories where the corporate shield inadequately protects
the shareholders from personal liability. The first two relate to
the creditors' ability to go behind the entity or "pierce the corporate
veil." These two categories comprise situations where the partici-
pants fail to follow the statutory formalities of operating the busi-
ness or inadequately capitalize the enterprise so that creditors are
subjected to unwarranted risk of loss. The third category involves
practical impediments to limited liability caused by operating the
close corporation as a chartered partnership or de facto proprietor-
ship.
A. Exposure to Liability Via Informality of Operation
Because the corporation is a creature of statute, the failure to
follow statutory formalities will often result in the corporate form
being disregarded and the recognition of individual shareholder lia-
bility. Perhaps the best example is a situation where the business
has been improperly incorporated, e.g., there may have been an im-
proper filing or no filing at all. In such a case, the corporation is
not a de jure entity and unless a particular jurisdiction accepts the
doctrine of de facto incorporation, the individual shareholders will
not be insulated.8
legatees) of corporate stock will be deemed to assent to existing agree-
ments only if they have actual knowledge of the agreement. This
would effectively protect principal shareholders from the argument that
they had "overreached" minority interests. Query whether, if in fact
such agreements are valid in Nebraska, subsequent transferees or
purchasers of stock must be placed on notice of agreements respecting
that stock.
88. See O'NEAL § 1.09 (a).
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Close corporations are especially susceptible to defects in for-
mality of operation rather than the formal prerequisites of in-
corporation. s Shareholders who know one another and are used
to operating the business with day to day contact are reluctant to
reduce all decisions to formal resolutions and votes. Under tradi-
tional statutory schemes the formalities of meetings and notice
requirements are clearly spelled out. Nebraska grants numerous
dispensations favorable to close corporations with respect to such
formalities,9" but the liability-conscious shareholder must be cogni-
zant of the statutory requirements, no matter how liberal, and con-
duct the affairs of the corporation accordingly or else subject him-
self to personal liability.91
Informal operation is not only dangerous because of the formal
statutory requirements, but also indicates how the individual parti-
cipant or principal shareholder views the enterprise. It may be
tacitly understood that the business is to continue under the direc-
tion of one or several participants, but their actions as shareholders
must respect the entity as a separate enterprise. One argument
often used to "pierce the corporate veil" is the assertion that the
enterprise is merely a nominal entity or simulacrum-the "alter
ego" of the operator or operators.92  If the enterprise merely
serves as a conduit for the participants' indivudual actions, a court
would have little difficulty in finding that the shareholders have
chosen to conduct their business without regard to the entity and
cannot assert its independent status as a shield. The participants
must respect the formalities of meetings, minute books and the
89. Id.
90. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 21-2028 (Reissue 1974).
91. To minimize the risk that courts will disregard a corporation's separate
personality, the organizers and managers of the corporation should
take the following precautions:
(1) establish and maintain the company as a separate business
and financial unit, keep separate records and accounts, and
assiduously avoid intermingling its funds, property and
transactions with those of its shareholders, directors or of
ficers;
(2) provide the corporation in the beginning with adequate
capital to meet the reasonably expected obligations and
contingencies of the enterprise;
(3) observe carefully the formalities of corporate procedure,
including the holding of shareholders' and directors' meet-
ings; and
(4) avoid representing in any way that the business is being
conducted by the participants as individuals or as partners.
O'NEAL § 1.10. It is submitted that following these types of formalities
may be a bit more of a task than the farm operator had in mind when
he decided to incorporate his business.
92. N. LATTIN, THE LAW or CoRPORATIoNs 86, 87 (1971).
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statutory scheme; the entity must be established and maintained
as a separate financial unit.93
One aspect of the foregoing involves the situation where a prin-
cipal shareholder fails to distinguish by accounts or otherwise be-
tween corporate and personal funds. This is a common situation in
the close corporate farm where many of the participants' assets are
tied up in corporate suspension.94 Such treatment would un-
doubtedly expose the shareholders to arguments designed to pierce
the corporate veil. Ironically, under Nebraska law, participants
may not be able to avoid this difficulty by formally maintaining
corporate books since the flow of corporate funds into the hands
of the shareholders is severely limited. By statute, a corporation
is prohibited from loaning funds to its directors. 95 Thus, the
shareholder/director is prohibited by common law as well as stat-
ute from using funds for his own needs-a situation absent when
he operated the business as a proprietorship.
As a practical matter, the prospective incorporator must balance
two inconsistent standards. On one hand, he desires to use the cor-
porate form to his advantage, specifically to escape personal lia-
bility, a desire which is unquestionably permitted. On the other
hand, there is a strict prohibition against using control of a corpo-
ration to further his own rather than the corporation's business.
If he violates the latter prohibition, he will be held liable for the
corporation's acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 96
This kind of activity is clearly seen as a perversion of the privilege
of incorporation.
B. Exposure to Liability due to Inadequate Capitalization
If the shareholders provide the enterprise with insufficient fi-
nancial resources, the resulting undercapitalization exposes them
to personal liability.97 While undercapitalization alone may not
93. See note 91 supra.
94. See Harl, Public Policy Aspects of Farm Incorporation, 20 Bus. LAw.
933 (1965). The traditional concept involves several shareholders
pitting their producing assets against the producing assets of others
to achieve an equitable distribution of equity. This might involve the
exchange of producing tools or producing services for the stock of the
corporation. See D. HEzwiTz, BusINEss PLANNIG 44-67 (1966).
95. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2045 (Reissue 1974).
96. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 214, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585
(1966).
97. There is some question whether undercapitalization, without more, is
a sufficient ground for disregarding the corporate entity and holding
the shareholders individually liable to claimants or creditors. Argu-
ably, it is a sufficient basis if it can be shown that the capital is "il-
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impose personal liability, it weighs heavily in determining the issue.
Undercapitalization is a fraud on credtiors and an abuse of the
separate entity. It will not exempt the shareholders from corporate
debts. If capital is illusory or trifling compared with the business
and the risks of loss, this is ground for denying the separate entity
privilege.'8
No particular debt-equity ratio is automatically acceptable for
the purposes of determining whether a corporate entity is ade-
quately financed,99 it is reasonably clear that shareholders must
have a realistic view of what their future obligations will be and
capitalize the enterprise accordingly. The principle of undercapi-
talization does not place an undue burden in the close corporation
but it does illustrate that the enterprise is more than a shell and
the hoped for advantages which attend that enterprise are not with-
out their costs.
C. Practical Liability
The close corporation may be a theoretical shield to individual
shareholder liability, but practicalities of the small farm business
are an impediment to this theoretical insulation. The former sole
proprietor sees the business as highly personal and a far cry from
the detached interests contemplated by shareholders of public issue
corporations.100 He may have such a personal interest in the busi-
ness that he is less concerned with limited liability than with the
successful operation of the business and may be willing to pledge
his personal credit in periods of financial stress or use personal
funds and assets to aid an ailing enterprise.
lusory or trifling compared with the business to be done and the risk
of loss . . . ." H. BALLANTnTE, CORPORATIONS § 129 (rev. ed. 1946).
98. Id. The question becomes to what extent the capitalization of the en-
terprise can be said to be "trifling." Clearly a corporation need not
infuse the treasury with funds required for any possible contingency.
See Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 214, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d
585 (1966); Note, Should Shareholders be Personally Liable for the
Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190 (1967).
99. Id.
100. Another practical consideration that militates against the sup-
posed advantage of sole corporate responsibility for debts is
the personal and emotional response of a man ... whose pro-
ductive years have been identified with the birth and growth
of... [his enterprise]. He is usually unable to view its fi-
nancial difficulties objectively and will usually pledge his per-
sonal credit when the business is in difficulties.
Kramer & Ziegler, supra note 96 at 516. On the other hand, the pub-
lic issue shareholder will have a ready market for the stock he holds
in a truly separate and removed enterprise.
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Financing institutions are often unwilling to loan funds to close
corporations without the personal guarantee of its participants.
The incorporated farm proves to be somewhat of an exception to
this rule, at least where plots of land are corporate assets. Lenders
would have little trouble loaning funds where substantial acreage
is available as collateral.
10 1
Additionally, there is the danger of personal liability resulting
from malfeasance in carrying out the function of director or officer.
The principle of limited liability does not protect shareholders ful-
filling the function of management from liability for participating
in torts, failing to carry out duties according to statute or abusing
the office they hold.
1'0 2
Thus, it can be seen that the concept of limited liability is truly
"limited" in the close corporation. Legal and practical limitations
are so numerous that blanket statements are not possible. One au-
thor has argued that the basic policies behind insulation of the
shareholders no longer exist in the area of close corporations-at
least with respect to tort liability-and perhaps the concept should
not apply to the closely held enterprise.
0 3
V. CONCLUSION
Although incorporation is often considered an advantage for the
private entrepreneur or partnership, it is not without its attending
complexities. For the farm operator, these complexities may be too
burdensome to warrant changing to the corporate form.
The greatest difficulty confronting prospective incorporators is
the problem of retaining control in themselves so that they can
carry on the business in an informal manner yet comply with statu-
tory norms which traditionally require that the management of a
corporation be vested in a board of directors. Those states which
have adopted close corporation legislation have dealt with this prob-
lem by allowing for the abolition of the board and formal manage-
ment by the shareholders. Although Nebraska has relatively
101. The tax-minded incorporator, however, might prefer keeping land out
of corporate suspension, opting for a rental arrangement under which
he would receive a fixed income for the use of the property. See East-
wood, The Farm Corporation From an Income Tax Viewpoint: Friend
or Foe?, 54 NEs. L. REV. 443 (1975).
102. O'NEAL § 1.10; Nichols v. Garrot, 139 Colo. 292, 338 P.2d 683 (1959).
In Nichols, personal liability was imposed upon directors and officers
for their failure to file required annual reports.
103. It is arguable that in the case of the close corporation, limited liabil-
ity should not be afforded, since they rarely have sufficient assets with
which to compensate tort victims.
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liberal corporate legislation by virtue of its Business Corporation
Act, it still demands that formal tribute be paid to the board of
directors myth. This problem is compounded by the fact that the
common law of Nebraska is more strict than its legislation. With-
out judicial interpretation of the Business Corporation Act, share-
holders are afforded little certainty concerning how informally they
may legally run their enterprise. Failure to follow the requisite
formalities could result in an inability to control recalcitrant share-
holders and the loss of the corporate shield for the purposes of
limited liability.
Moreover the process of incorporation involves expense and
complexity in terms of arranging the corporate charter and allocat-
ing the equity interests among all the shareholders. In short, the
complexities and expense of incorporating the family farm may
simply not be worth the effort.
The sole proprietor struggles to retain control of his newly
formed corporation. He combats statutes which are tailored to the
large public corporation with charter provisions, by-laws, voting
trusts and shareholder agreements. One of his main goals, other
than tax advantages, 10 6 is limited liability-the separation of his
personal liability from that of his new legal entity. After success-
fully complying with the statutes and receiving the corporate char-
ter the sole proprietor learns that limited liability is illusory with
regard to his close corporation; the bank won't lend funds without
his personal signature; personal liability for his tortious acts re-
mains; and the "corporate veil" will be pierced if the business is
undercapitalized or if he operates the corporation as his alter ego.
Farm lands and equipment must be appraised in order to cal-
culate equity contributions. The charter, by-laws and shareholder
agreements must be drafted; salaries of directors and officers must
be paid. These procedures are expensive and time consuming. The
sole proprietor must balance the advantages against the costs and
disadvantages for his situation. Incorporating requires an analysis
of the unique problems of the proprietor and his business. The
practioner must realize that the best course of action may be
not to incorporate.
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